Over recent years, devising classification algorithms that are robust to adversarial perturbations has emerged as a challenging problem. In particular, deep neural nets (DNNs) seem to be susceptible to small imperceptible changes over test instances. In this work, we study whether there is any learning task for which it is possible to design classifiers that are only robust against polynomial-time adversaries. Indeed, numerous cryptographic tasks (e.g. encryption of long messages) are only be secure against computationally bounded adversaries, and are indeed impossible for computationally unbounded attackers. Thus, it is natural to ask if the same strategy could help robust learning. We show that computational limitation of attackers can indeed be useful in robust learning by demonstrating a classifier for a learning task in which computational and information theoretic adversaries of bounded perturbations have very different power. Namely, while computationally unbounded adversaries can attack successfully and find adversarial examples with small perturbation, polynomial time adversaries are unable to do so unless they can break standard cryptographic hardness assumptions. Our results, therefore, indicate that perhaps a similar approach to cryptography (relying on computational hardness) holds promise for achieving computationally robust machine learning. We also show that the existence of such learning task in which computational robustness beats information theoretic robustness implies (average case) hard problems in NP.
Introduction
Designing classifiers that are robust to small perturbations to test instances has emerged as a challenging task in machine learning. The goal of robust learning is to design classifiers h that still correctly predicts the true label even if the input x is perturbed minimally to a "close" instance x ′ . In fact, it was shown (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) that many learning algorithms, and in particular DNNs, are highly vulnerable to such small perturbations and thus adversarial examples can be successfully found. Since then, the machine learning community has been actively engaged to address this problem with many new defenses (Papernot et al., 2016; Biggio & Roli, 2018) and novel and powerful attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018) .
Do adversarial examples always exist?
This state of affairs suggest that perhaps the existence of adversarial example is due to fundamental reasons that might be inevitable. A sequence of work (Gilmer et al., 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018; Diochnos et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2018; Dohmatob, 2018) show that for natural theoretical distributions (e.g., isotropic Gaussian of dimension n) and natural metrics over them (e.g., ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 or ℓ 2 ), adversarial examples are inevitable. Namely, the concentration of measure phenomenon (Ledoux, 2001; Milman & Schechtman, 1986) in such metric probability spaces imply that small perturbations are enough to map almost all the instances x into a close x ′ that is misclassified. This line of work, however, does not yet say anything about "natural" distributions of interest such as images or voice, as the precise nature of such distributions are yet to be understood.
Can lessons from cryptography help? Given the pessimistic state of affairs, researchers have asked if we could use lessons from cryptography to make progress on this problem (Madry, 2018; Goldwasser, 2018; . Indeed, numerous cryptographic tasks (e.g. encryption of long messages) can only be realized against attackers that are computationally bounded. In particular, we know that all encryption methods that use a short key to encrypt much longer messages are insecure against computationally unbounded adversaries. However, when restricted to computationally bounded adversaries this task becomes feasible and suffices for numerous settings. This insight has been extremely influential in cryptography. Nonetheless, despite attempts to build on this insight in the learning setting, we have virtually no evidence on whether this approach is promising. Thus, we ask:
Could we even hope to leverage computational hardness for adversarially robust learning?
Taking a step in realizing this vision, we provide formal definitions for computational variants of robust learning. Following the cryptographic literature, we provide a game based definition of computationally robust learning. Very roughly, a game-based definition consists of two entities: a challenger and an attacker, that interact with each other. In our case, as the first step the challenger generates independent samples from the distribution at hand, use those samples to train a learning algorithm, and obtain a hypothesis h. Additionally, the challenger samples a fresh challenge sample x from the underlying distribution. Next, the challenger provides the attacker with oracle access to h(·) and x. At the end of this game, the attacker outputs a value x ′ to the challenger. The attacker declares this execution as a "WIN" if x ′ is obtained as a small perturbation of x and leads to a misclassification. We say that the learning is computationally robust as long as no attacker from a class of adversaries can "WIN" the above game with a probability much better than some base value. (See Definition 2.1.) This definition is very general and it implies various notions of security by restricting to various classes of attackers. While we focus on polynomially bounded attackers in this paper, we remark that one may also naturally consider other natural classes of attackers based on the setting of interest (e.g. an attacker that can only modify certain part of the image).
What if adversarial examples are actually easy to find? studied this question, and showed that as long as the input instances come from a product distribution, and if the distances are measured in Hamming distance, adversarial examples with sublinear perturbations can be found in polynomial time. This result, however, did not say anything about other distributions or metrics such as ℓ ∞ . Thus, it was left open whether computational hardness could be leveraged in any learning problem to guarantee its robustness.
Our Results
From computational hardness to computational robustness. In this work, we show that computational hardness can indeed be leveraged to help robustness. In particular, we present a learning problem P that has a classifier h P that is only computationally robust. In fact, let Q be any learning problem that has a classifier with "small" risk α, but that adversarial examples exist for classifier h Q with higher probability β ≫ α under the ℓ 0 norm (e.g., Q could be any of the well-studied problems in the literature with a vulnerable classifier h Q under norm ℓ 0 ). Then, we show that there is a "related" problem P and a related classifier h P that has computational risk (i.e., risk in the presence of computationally bounded tampering adversaries) at most α, but the risk of h P will go up all the way to ≈ β if the tampering attackers are allowed to be computationally unbounded. Namely, computationally bounded adversaries have a much smaller chance of finding adversarial examples of small perturbations for h P than computationally unbounded attackers do. (See Theorem 3.4.)
The computational robustness of the above construction relies on allowing the hypothesis to sometimes "detect" tampering and output a special symbol ⋆. The goal of the attacker is to make the hypothesis output a wrong label and not get detected. Therefore, we have proved, along the way, that allowing tamper detection can also be useful for robustness. Allowing tamper detection, however, is not always an option. For example a real-time decision making classifier (e.g., classifying a traffic sign) that has to output a label, even if it detects that something might be suspicious about the input image. We prove that even in this case, there is a learning problem P with binary labels and a classifier h for P such that computational risk of h is almost zero, while its information theoretic risk is ≈ 1/2, which makes classifiers' decisions under attack meaningless. (See Theorem 3.9).
In summary, our work provides credence that perhaps restricting attacks to computationally bounded adversaries holds promise for achieving computationally robust machine learning that relies on computational hardness assumptions as is currently done in cryptography.
From computational robustness back to computational hardness. Our first result shows that computational hardness can be leveraged in some cases to obtain nontrivial computational robustness that beats information theoretic robustness. But how about the reverse direction; are computational hardness assumptions necessary for this goal? We also prove such reverse direction and show that nontrivial computational robustness implies computationally hard problems in NP. In particular, we show that a non-negligible gap between the success probability of computationally bounded vs. that of unbounded adversaries in attacking the robustness of classifiers implies strong average-case hard distributions for class NP. Namely, we prove that if the distribution D of the instances in learning task is efficiently samplable, and if a classifier h for this problem has computational robustness α, information theoretic robustness β, and α < β, then one can efficiently sample from a distribution S that generates Boolean formulas φ ← S that are satisfiable with overwhelming probability, yet no efficient algorithm can find the satisfying assignments of φ ← S with a non-negligible probability. (See Theorem 4.2 for the formal statement.)
What world do we live in? As explained above, our main question is whether adversarial examples could be prevented by relying on computational limitations of the adversary. In fact, even if adversarial examples exist for a classifier, we might be living in either of two completely differnet worlds. One is a world in which computationally unbounded adversaries can find adversarial examples (almost) whenever they exist; and thus, they would be as powerful as information-theoretic adversaries. Another world is one in which machine learning could leverage computational hardness. Our work suggests that there are problems for which this is true, and thus we are living in the better world. Whether or not we can achieve computational robustness for practical problems (such as image classification) that beats their information-theoretic robustness remains an intriguing open question. A related line of work (Bubeck et al., 2018b,a; Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan, 2019) studied other "worlds" that we might be living in, and studied whether adversarial examples are due to the computational hardness of learning robust classifiers. They designed learning problems demonstrating that in some worlds, robust classifiers might exist, while they are hard to be obtained efficiently. We note however, that the goal of those works and our work are quite different. They deal with how computational constraints might be an issue and prevent the learner from reaching its goal, while our focus is on how such constraints on adversaries can help us achieve robustness guarantees that are not achievable information theoretically.
Other related work. In another line of work (Raghunathan et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018; ) the notion of certifiable robustness was developed to prove robustness for individual test instances. More formally, they aim at providing robustness certificates with bounds ε x along with a decision h(x) made on a test instance x, with the guarantee that any x ′ at distance at most ε x from x is correctly classified. However, these guarantees, so far, are not strong enough to rule out attacks completely, as larger magnitudes of perturbation (than the levels certified) still can fool the classifiers while the instances look the same to the human.
Other norms. Our main result of separating computational and information theoretic robustness (Theorem 3.4) is proved using Hamming distance over Boolean strings (of length ≈ n) which is equivalent to using ℓ 0 norm over the "noise" added to the input. For any Boolean "noise" vector e ∈ {0, 1} n , we have e p = ( e 0 ) 1/p for any 0 ≤ p < ∞ where e p is x's ℓ p norm. So, we immediately get results for other norms as well. Our result of obtaining hardness from computational robustness (Theorem 4.2) is general and applies to any polynomial time computable metric or norm.
Techniques
We prove our main result about the possibility of computationally robust classifiers (Theorem 3.4) by "wrapping" an arbitrary learning problem Q with a vulnerable classifier by adding computational certification based on cryptographic digital signatures to test instances. A digital signature scheme (see Definition 3.1) operates based on two generated keys (vk, sk), where sk is private and is used for signing messages, and vk is public and is used for verifying signatures. Such schemes come with the guarantee that a computationally bounded adversary with the knowledge of vk cannot sign new messages on its own, even if it is given signatures on some previous messages. Digital signature schemes can be constructed based on the assumption that one-way functions exist. 4 Below we describe the ideas behind this result in two steps.
(Initial Attempt). Suppose D Q is the distribution over X ×Y of a learning problem Q with input space X and label space Y. Suppose D Q had a hypothesis h Q that can predict correct labels reasonably well, Pr (x,y)←D Q [h(x) = y] ≤ α. Suppose, at the same time, that a (perhaps computationally unbounded) adversary A can perturb test instances like x into a close adversarial example x ′ that is now likely to be misclassified by h Q ,
Now we describe a related problem P, its distribution of examples D P , and a classifier h P for P. To sample an example from D P , we first sample (x, y) ← D Q and then modify x to x = (x, σ x ) by attaching a short signature σ x = Sign(sk, x) to x. The label y of x remains the same as that of x.
Note that sk will be kept secret to the sampling algorithm of D P . The new classifier h P will rely on the public parameter vk that is available to it. Given an input x = (x, σ x ), h P first checks its integrity by verifying that the given signature σ x is valid for x. If the signature verification does not pass, h P rejects the input as adversarial without outputting a label, but if this test passes, h P outputs h Q (x).
To successfully find an adversarial example x ′ for h P through a small perturbation of x = (x, σ) sampled as (x, y) ← D P , an adversary A can pursue either of the following strategies. (I) One strategy is that A tries to find a new signature σ ′ = σ x for the same x, which will constitute as a sufficiently small perturbation as the signature is short. Doing so, however, is not considered a successful attack, as the label of x ′ remains the same as that of the true label of the untampered point x. (II) Another strategy is to perturb the x part of x into a close instance x ′ and then trying to find a correct signature σ ′ for it, and outputting x ′ = (x ′ , σ ′ ). Doing so would be a successful attack, because the signature is short, and thus x ′ would indeed be a close instance to x. However, doing this is computationally infeasible, due to the very security definition of the signature scheme. Note that (x ′ σ ′ ) is a forgery for the signature scheme, which a computationally bounded adversary cannot construct because of the security of the underlying signature scheme. This means that the computational risk of h P would remain at most α.
We now observe that information theoretic (i.e., computationally unbounded) attackers can succeed in finding adversarial examples for h P with probability at least β ≫ α. In particular, such attacks can first find an adversarial example x ′ for x (which is possible with probability β over the sampled x), construct a signature σ ′ for x ′ , and then output (x ′ , σ ′ ). Recall that an unbounded adversary can construct a signature σ ′ for x ′ using exhaustive search.
(Actual construction). One main issue with the above construction is that it needs to make vk publicly available, as a public parameter to the hypothesis (after it is sampled as part of the description of the distribution D P ). The other issue is that the distribution D P is not publicly samplable in polynomial time, because to get a sample from D P one needs to use the signing key sk, but that key is kept secret. We resolve these two issues with two more ideas. The first idea is that, instead of generating one pair of keys (vk, sk) for D P and keeping sk D secret, we can generate a fresh pair of keys (vk x , sk x ) every time that we sample (x, y) ← D Q and attach vk x also to the actual instance x = (x, σ x , vk k ). The modified hypothesis h P also uses this key and verifies (x, σ x ) using vk x . This way, the distribution D P is publicly samplable, and moreover, there is no need for making vk available as a public parameter. However, this change of the distribution D P introduces a new possible way to attack the scheme and to find adversarial examples. In particular, now the adversary can try to perturb vk x into a close string vk ′ for which it knows a corresponding signing key sk ′ , and then use sk ′ to sign an adversarial example x ′ for x and output (x ′ , σ ′ , vk ′ ). However, to make this attack impossible for the attacker under small perturbations of instances, we use error correction codes and employ an encoding [vk x ] of the verification key (instead of vk x ) that needs too much change before one can fool a decoder to decode to any other vk ′ = vk x . But as long as the adversary cannot change vk x , the adversary cannot attack the robustness computationally. (See Construction 3.3.) To analyze the construction above (see Theorem 3.4), we note that the computational robustness of h P can be as high as Ω(n), because the encoded [vk] would need Ω(n) to change the encoded vk, and if vk remains the same it is hard computationally to do any attack beyond the original risk of the problem Q (that needs no adversarial perturbations). On the other hand, a computationally unbounded adversary can focus on perturbing x into x ′ and then forge a short signatures for it, which means b + |σ x | bits of tampering, and this could be as small as poly(log n).
Our construction above has the benefit that it could be defined as a wrapper around any natural vulnerable classifier. However, the computational robustness of the constructed classifier relies on sometimes detecting tampering attacks and not outputting a label. We give an alternative construction for a setting that the classifier always has to output a label. We again use digital signatures as the main ingredient of our construction, though our construction is no longer wrapped around and arbitrary natural task. See Construction 3.8 for more details.
Defining Computational Risk and Computationally Robust Learning
Notation. We use calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) for sets and capital non-calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for distributions. By d ← D we denote sampling d from D. For a randomized algorithm R(·), y ← R(x) we denotes the randomized execution of R on input x outputting y. A classification problem P = (X , Y, D, H) is specified by the following components: set X is the set of possible instances, Y is the set of possible labels, D ∈ D is a joint distribution over X ×Y, and H is the space of hypothesis. For simplicity we work with problems that have a single distribution D (e.g., D is the distribution of labeled images from a data set like MNIST or CIFAR-10). We did not state the loss function explicitly, as we work with classification problems and use the zero-one loss by default. For the fixed distribution D, the risk or error of a hypothesis h ∈ H is Risk(h) = Pr (x,y)←D [h(x) = y]. We are usually interested in learning problems P = (X , Y, D, H) with a specific metric d defined over X for the purpose of defining adversarial perturbations of bounded magnitude controlled by d.
In that case, we might simply write
}|, but our definitions can be adapted to any other metrics. We usually work with families of problems P n where n determines the length of x ∈ X n (and thus input lengths of h ∈ H n , c ∈ C n , d n ).
Allowing tamper detection. In this work we expand the standard notion of hypotheses and allow h ∈ H to output a special symbol ⋆ as well (without adding ⋆ to Y), namely we have h : X → Y ∪ {⋆}. This symbol can be used to denote "out of distribution" points, or any form of tampering. In natural scenarios, h(x) = ⋆ when x is not an adversarially tampered instance. However, we allow this symbol to be output by h even in no-attack settings as long as its probability is small enough.
We follow the tradition of game-based security definitions in cryptography (Naor, 2003; Shoup, 2004; Goldwasser & Kalai, 2016; Rogaway & Zhang, 2018) . Games are the most common way that security is defined in cryptography. These games are defined between a challenger Chal and an adversary A. Consider the case of a signature scheme. In this case the challenger Chal is a signature scheme Π and an adversary A is given oracle access to the signing functionality (i.e. adversary can give a message m i to the oracle and obtains the corresponding signature σ i ). Adversary A wins the game if he can provide a valid signature on a message that was not queried to the oracle. The security of the signature scheme is then defined informally as follows: any probabilistic polynomial time/size adversary A can win the game by probability that is bounded by a negligible n −ω(1) function on the security parameter. We describe a security game for tampering adversaries with bounded tampering budget in HD, but the definition is more general and can be used for other adversary classes. 
2.
Chal then samples a test example (x, y) ← D and sends (x, y) to the adversary A.
Having oracle (gates, in case of circuits) access to hypothesis h and a sampler for D, the adversary obtains the adversarial instance
Winning conditions: In case x = x ′ , the adversary A wins if h(x) = y, 5 and in case x = x ′ , the adversary wins if all the following hold: (1) 
Why separating winning case for x = x ′ from x = x ′ ? One might wonder why we separate the winning condition for the two cases of x = x ′ and x = x ′ . The reason is that ⋆ is supposed to capture tamper detection. So, if the adversary does not change x and the hypothesis outputs h(x) = ⋆, this is an error, and thus should contribute to the risk. More formally, when we evaluate risk, we have Risk(h) = Pr (x,y)←D [h(x) = y], which implicitly means that outputting ⋆ contributes to the risk. However, if adversary's perturbs to x ′ = x leads to h(x ′ ) = ⋆, it means the adversary has not succeeded in its attack, because the tampering is detected. In fact, if we simply require the other 3 conditions to let adversary win, the notion of "adversarial risk" (see Definition 2.2) might be even less than the normal risk, which is counter intuitive.
Alternative definitions of winning for the adversary. The winning condition for the adversary could be defined in other ways as well. In our Definition 2.1, the adversary wins if d(x, x ′ ) ≤ b and h(x ′ ) = y. This condition is inspired by the notion of corrupted input Feige et al. (2015) , is extended to metric spaces in , and is used in and many subsequent works. An alternative definition for adversary's goal, formalized in Diochnos et al. (2018) . This condition requires the misclassification of x ′ , and thus, x ′ would belong to the "error-region" of h. Namely, if we let c(x) = y be the ground truth function, the error-region security game requires h(x ′ ) = c(x ′ ). Another stronger definition of adversarial risk is given by Suggala et al. (2018) in which the requirement condition requires both conditions: (1) the ground truth should not change c(x) = c(x ′ ), and that (2) x ′ is misclassified. For natural distributions like images or voice, where the ground truth is robust to small perturbations, all these three definitions for adversary's winning are equivalent.
Stronger attack models. In the attack model of Definition 2.1, we only provided the label y of x to the adversary and also give her the sample oracle from D. A stronger attacker can have access to the "concept" function c(x) which is sampled from the distribution of y given x (according to D). This concept oracle might not be efficiently computable, even in scenarios that D is efficiently samplable. In fact, even if D is not efficiently samplable, just having access to a large enough pool of i.i.d. sampled data from D is enough to run the experiment of Definition 2.1. In alternative winning conditions (e.g., the error-region definition) for Definition 2.1 discussed above, it makes more sense to also include the ground truth concept oracle c(·) given as oracle to the adversary, as the adversary needs to achieve h(x ′ ) = c(x ′ ). Another way to strengthen the power of adversary is to give him non-black-box access to the components of the game (see Papernot et al. (2017) ). In definition 2.1, by default, we model adversaries who have black-box access to h(·), D, but one can define non-black-box (a.k.a. white-box) access to each of h(·), D, if they are polynomial size objects. 
is a learner that outputs a fixed hypothesis h, by substituting h with L, we obtain the following similar notions for h:
, and AdvRisk b,s (h). Definition 2.3 (Computationally robust learners and hypotheses). Let P n = (X , Y, D, H) be a family of classification parameterized by n. We say that a learning algorithm L is a computationally robust learner with risk at most R = R(n) against b = b(n)-perturbing adversaries, if for any polynomial s = s(n), there is a negligible function negl(n) = n −ω (1) such that
Again, when L is a learner that outputs a fixed hypothesis h for each n, we say that h is a computationally robust hypothesis with risk at most
In both cases, we might simply say that L (or h) has computational risk at most R(n).
Discussion (falsifiability of computational robustness).
If the learner L is polynomial time, and that the distribution D is samplable in polynomial time (e.g., by sampling y first and then using a generative model to generate x for y), then the the computational robustness of learners as defined based on Definitions 2.3 and 2.1 is a "falsifiable" notion of security as defined by Naor (2003) . Namely, if an adversary claims that it can break the computational robustness of the learner L, it can prove so in polynomial time by participating in a challenge-response game and winning in this game with a noticeable probability more than R(n). This feature is due to the crucial property of the challenger in Definition 2.1 that is a polynomial time algorithm itself, and thus can be run efficiently. Not all security games have efficient challengers (e.g., see Pandey et al. (2008) ).
From Computational Hardness to Computational Robustness
In this section, we will first prove our main result that shows the existence of a learning problem with classifiers that are only computationally robust. We first prove our result by starting from any hypothesis that is vulnerable to adversarial examples; e.g., this could be any of the numerous algorithms shown to be susceptible to adversarial perturbations.
Before going over the constructions, we recall some useful tools.
Useful Tools
Definition 3.1 (One-time signature schemes). A one-time signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Verify) consists of three probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
which satisfy the following properties:
Verify(vk, σ, m) = 1] = 1.
Unforgeability:
For every positive polynomial s, for every λ and every pair of circuits (A 1 , A 2 ) with size s(λ) the following probability is negligible in λ:
Definition 3.2 (Error correction codes).
An error correction code with code rate α and error rate β consists of two algorithms Encode and Decode as follows.
• The encode algorithm Encode takes a Boolean string m and outputs a Boolean string c such that |c| = |m|/α.
• The decode algorithm Decode takes a Boolean string c and outputs either ⊥ or a Boolean string m. It holds that for all m ∈ {0, 1} * , c = Encode(m) and c ′ where HD(c, c ′ ) ≤ β · |c|, it holds that Decode(c ′ ) = m.
Computational Robustness with Tamper Detection
Our first construction uses hypothesis with tamper detection (i.e, output ⋆ capability). Construction 3.3 (Computational robustness using tamper detection). Let Q = ({0, 1} d , Y, D, H) be a learning problem and h ∈ H a classifier for Q such that Risk(h) = α. We construct a family of learning problems P {n∈N} (based on the fixed problem Q) with a family of classifiers h {n∈N} . In our construction we use signature scheme (KGen, Sign, Verify) for which the bit-length of vk is λ and the bit-length of signature is ℓ(λ) = polylog(λ) . 6 We also use an error correction code (Encode, Decode) with code rate cr = Ω(1) and error rate er = Ω(1).
The space of instances for
P n is X n = {0, 1} n+d+ℓ(n) .
The set of labels is
3. The distribution D n is defined by the following process: first sample (x, y) ← D, (sk, vk) ← KGen(1 n·cr ), σ ← Sign(sk, x), then encode [vk] = Encode(vk) and output ((x, σ, [vk] ), y).
The classifier h
Theorem 3.4. For family P n of Construction 3.3, the family of classifiers h n is computationally robust with risk at most α against adversaries with budget er · n. On the other hand h n is not robust against information theoretic adversaries of budget b + ℓ(n), if h is not robust to b perturbations:
Theorem 3.4 means that, the computational robustness of h n could be as large as Ω(n) (by choosing a code with constant error correction rate) while its information theoretic adversarial robustness could be as small as b + polylog(n) ≤ polylog(n) (note that b is a constant here) by choosing a signature scheme with short signatures of poly-logarithmic length.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
We first prove the following claim about the risk of h n .
Claim 3.5. For problem P n we have Risk(h n ) = α.
Proof. The proof follows from the completeness of the signature scheme. We have,
Now we prove the computational robustness of h n .
Claim 3.6. For family P n , and for any polynomial s(·) there is a negligible function negl such that for all n ∈ N AdvRisk er·n,s (h n ) ≤ α + negl(n).
Proof. Let A {n∈N} be the family of circuits maximizing the adversarial risk for h n for all n ∈ N. We build a sequence of circuits A 
n can provide all the oracles needed to run A n if the sampler from D, h and c are all computable by a circuit of polynomial size. Otherwise, we need to assume that our signature scheme is secure with respect to those oracles and the proof will follow. We have, [vk] ) implies that Decode(vk ′ ) = vk based on the error rate of the error correcting code. Also h n (x ′ , σ ′ , vk ′ ) = ⋆ implies that σ ′ is a valid signature for x ′ under verification key vk. Therefore, we have,
Thus, by the unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme we have
which by Claim 3.5 implies
Now we show that h n is not robust against computationally unbounded attacks.
Claim 3.7. For family P n and any n, b ∈ N we have [vk] ) where x ′ is the closes point to x where h(x) = y and σ ′ is a valid signature such that Verify(vk, x * , σ ′ ) = 1. Based on the fact that the size of signature is ℓ(n), we have
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Computational Robustness without Tamper Detection
The following theorem shows an alternative construction that is incomparable to Construction 3.3, as it does not use any tamper detection. On the down side, the construction is not defined with respect to an arbitrary (vulnerable) classifier of a natural problem. We construct a family of learning problems P {n∈N} with a family of classifiers h {n∈N} . In our construction we use a signature scheme (KGen, Sign, Verify) for which the bit-length of vk is λ and the bit-length of signature is ℓ(λ) = polylog(λ) and an error correction code (Encode, Decode) with code rate cr = Ω(1) and error rate er = Ω(1).
The space of instances for
2. The set of labels is Y n = {0, 1}. 
The distribution

The classifier h
Theorem 3.9. For family P n of Construction 3.8, the family of classifiers h n has risk 0 and is computationally robust with risk at most 0 against adversaries of budget er · n. On the other hand h n is not robust against information theoretic adversaries of budget ℓ(n):
Note that reaching adversarial risk 1/2 makes the classifier's decisions meaningless as a random coin toss achieves this level of accuracy.
Proof of Theorem 3.9 . First it is clear that for problem P n we have Risk(h n ) = 0. Now we prove the computational robustness of h n . Claim 3.10. For family P n , and for any polynomial s(·) there is a negligible function negl such that for all n ∈ N AdvRisk er·n,s (h n ) ≤ negl(n).
Proof. Similar to proof of Claim 3.6 we prove this based on the security of the signature scheme. Let A {n∈N} be the family of circuits maximizing the adversarial risk for h n for all n ∈ N. We build a sequence of circuits A 
. Then it checks all σ i 's and if there is any of them that Verify(vk, σ i , x) = 1 it outputs (x, σ i ), otherwise it aborts and outputs ⊥. If y = 0 it aborts and outputs ⊥. Note that A 2 n can provide all the oracles needed to run A n if the sampler from D, h and c are all computable by a circuit of polynomial size. Otherwise, we need to assume that our signature scheme is secure with respect to those oracles and the proof will follow. We have, [vk] ) implies that Decode(vk ′ ) = vk and Decode(x ′ ) = x based on the error rate of the error correcting code. Also h n (x ′ , (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), vk ′ ) = y implies that y = 0. This is because if y = 1, the adversary has to make all the signatures invalid which is impossible with tampering budget cr · n. Therefore y must be 1 and one of the signatures in (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) must pass the verification because the prediction of h λ should be 1. Therefore we have
Claim 3.11. For family P n and any n ∈ N we have 
[vk]) = 1 because the first signature is always a valid signature. Therefore we have This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.9.
4 Average-Case Hardness of NP from Computational Robustness
In this section, we show a converse result to those in Section 3, going from useful computational robustness to deriving computational hardness. Namely, we show that if for there is a learning problem whose computational risk is noticeably more than its information theoretic risk, then NP is hard even on average.
Definition 4.1 (Hard samplers for NP). Let SAT be the language of specifiable Boolean formulas. Suppose S(1 n , r) is a polynomial time randomized algorithm that takes 1 n and randomness r, runs in time poly(n), and outputs Boolean formulas. We call S a hard sampler for NP if,
For a negligible function negl it holds that
Pr φ←S [φ ∈ SAT] = 1 − negl(n).
For every poly-size circuit A, there is a negligible negl, Pr φ←S,t←A(φ) [φ(t) = 1] = negl(n).
The following theorem is stated for computationally robust learning, but the same proof holds for computationally robust hypotheses as well. Then, there is a hard sampler for NP.
Before proving Theorem 4.2, we recall a useful lemma. The same proof of amplification of (weak to strong) one-way functions by Yao (1982) and described in (Goldreich, 2007) , or the parallel repetition of verifiable puzzles (Canetti et al., 2005; Holenstein & Schoenebeck, 2011) can be used to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 (Amplification of verifiable puzzles)
. Suppose S is a distribution over Boolean formulas such that for every poly-size adversary A, for sufficiently large n, it holds that solving the puzzles generated by S are weakly hard. Namely, Pr φ←S(1 n ,r1) [φ(t) = 1; t ← A(φ)] ≤ ε for ε = 1/poly(n). Then, for any polynomial-size adversary A, there is a negligible function negl, such that the probability that A can simultanously solve all of k = n/ε puzzles φ 1 , . . . , φ k that are independently sampled from S is at most negl(n).
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
First consider the following sampler S 1 . (We will modify S 1 later on).
Conclusion
The assumption of computationally-bounded adversaries has been the key to modern cryptography. In fact, without this assumption modern cryptographic primitives would not be possible. This paper investigates whether this assumption helps in the context of robust learning and demonstrates that is indeed the case (i.e., computational hardness can be leveraged in robust learning). We hope that this work is the first-step in leveraging computational hardness in the context of robust learning.
Several intriguing questions remain, such as:
• Our Construction 3.4 takes a natural learning problem, but then it modifies it. Can computational robustness be achieved for natural problems, such as image classification? • Theorem 4.2 shows that computational hardness is necessary for nontrivial computational robustness. However, this does not still mean we can get cryptographic primitives back from such problems. Can we obtain cryptographically useful primitives, such as one-way functions, from such computational robustness?
